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ABSTRACT 
TWO ESSAYS ON EARNINGS QUALITY AND CORPORATE 
DECISIONS 
QIAN SUN, Doctor of Philosophy, 2009 
Dissertation Directed By: Professors Kenneth Yung, Mohammad Najand, and Vinod B. 
Agarwal 
Department of Finance 
College of Business & Public Administration 
This dissertation investigates how earnings quality as an information risk may facilitate 
our understanding of the choice of payment method in Mergers and acquisitions and the 
value and the level of corporate cash holdings. In a world of asymmetric information and 
agency problem, Poor earnings quality implies the inadequate supply of relevant and reliable 
information for investors to monitor and discipline the behavior of firm managers to act in 
shareholder and stakeholder's best interest. 
This study contributes to the literature in three folds. First, I add to the literature by 
postulating that earnings quality has a significant impact on the choice of payment 
method in mergers and acquisitions. I hypothesize that M&A payment methods represent 
a desire by the acquiring firm's manager to strike a balance between protecting personal 
pecuniary benefits based on the firm's earnings quality (incentive alignment effects), not 
losing control of the company (entrenchment effects) and reserving cash for the firm's 
future growth (growth opportunity consideration). Second, by focusing on earnings 
quality as an information risk, I am able to explain simultaneously that the value of cash 
holdings could decline and yet firms have incentives to hold more cash. I offer 
explanations that the two phenomena are not inconsistent with each other and that they 
could exist at the same time. Third, my study adds to the literature on the determinants of 
the level of corporate cash holdings. The earnings quality augmented model has 
significantly smaller prediction errors relative to existing models in predicting the level of 
corporate cash holdings. 
In Essay I, with earnings quality measured in a way to reflect a firm's information risk, I 
show that acquisition financing is also affected by the acquirer's earnings quality. I find 
that acquiring firms with poor earnings quality prefer a lower cash payment in 
acquisitions, but those with low insider ownership stakes prefer cash over stock even if 
the earnings quality is poor. Unlike previous studies, I find that high insider ownerships 
of acquiring firms do not have a significant impact on the amount of cash paid in 
corporate acquisitions. 
In Essay II, Using a sample period between 1980 and 2005 for U.S. publicly traded firms, 
I find that poor earnings quality has a negative impact on the value of corporate cash 
holdings. I also find that poor earnings quality is positively related to the level of 
corporate cash holdings. Moreover, the earnings quality augmented model has 
significantly smaller prediction errors relative to existing models in predicting the level of 
corporate cash holdings. 
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Researchers have related the choice of payment method in acquisitions to factors such as 
growth opportunities, stock price performance, corporate control, managerial equity 
ownership, and target size. In this study, we show that acquisition financing is also 
affected by the acquirer's earnings quality. Mergers and acquisitions, being significant 
events in the history of a firm, represent excellent opportunities for researchers to 
investigate the earnings quality information impounded by acquiring managers. 
Managerial decisions are likely to contain information about earnings quality because 
managers make decisions based on current and future earnings. Thus, to the extent that 
the acquiring manager is more informative than investors about the earnings quality of 
the acquiring firm, the acquiring manager is likely to choose a payment method that 
enables him to take advantage of his superior information. We add to the literature by 
showing that the choice of payment method in mergers and acquisitions is also 
significantly affected by the earnings quality of the acquiring firm. 
In Chapter 2, we document that acquiring firms with poor earnings quality prefer a lower 
cash payment in acquisitions. In addition, acquirers with low insider ownership stakes 
prefer cash over stock financing even if the earnings quality is poor. Unlike previous 
studies, we find that high insider ownerships of acquiring firms do not have a significant 
impact on the amount of cash paid in corporate acquisitions. 
In general, it is likely that the acquiring manager tends to prefer cash (stock) financing 
when the earnings quality of the acquiring firm is high (low). However, with the value of 
managerial ownership at stake, the acquiring manager's chosen acquisition payment 
method reflects a trade-off between personal wealth and control benefits. Entrenched 
managers prefer cash over stock as the acquisition payment method even if the acquiring 
firm's earnings quality is poor. In situations where the acquiring manager wants to strike 
a balance between protecting the value of his stock ownership as well as control benefits, 
the chosen payment method would be a combination that has more (less) cash and less 
(more) stock if the earnings quality is high (low). 
It has been found in recent research (Faulkender and Wang (2005) and Pinkowitz, Stulz, 
and Williamson (2006)) that the market value of corporate cash holdings could be less 
than the actual dollar value when investors expect private benefits to be extracted by firm 
managers from the cash holdings. At the same time, there is evidence showing that the 
cash reserves held by U.S. firms have increased substantially in the last two decades. 
According to Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2006), the median cash-to-assets ratio for 13,237 
U.S. industrial firms has increased from 5.5% to 14.73% between 1980 and 2004. The 
question of why firms choose to hold more and more cash reserves at the amounts well 
exceed those predicted by conventional models while holding excess cash may destroy 
firm value motivates Chapter 3 of the study. 
There are two strands of recent research related to the above two phenomena. The first 
strand of studies examines how the value of corporate cash holdings is affected by firm-
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specific factors (Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2006; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 
2006; Faulkender and Wang, 2006). The second strand of studies explains why firms 
hold so much cash (Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2003; Bates, Kahle, Stulz, 2006; 
Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite, 2007). While the two phenomena are not necessarily 
inconsistent, researchers in general treat the two as separate issues. In considering 
earnings quality as an information risk, I am able to explain that poor earnings quality has 
a negative impact on the value of corporate cash holdings and a positive impact on the 
level of cash reserves. That is, the two phenomena could exist simultaneously and that 
they are not necessarily inconsistent with each other. I offer explanations that are related 
to the predictions of agency theories and asymmetric information arguments. In relating 
earnings quality to corporate cash holdings, I highlight investors' concerns about the 
discretionary use of corporate cash holdings when firm managers decide to present less 
reliable earnings information to the market. 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 investigates the 
effects of earnings quality as an information risk on the choice of payment method in 
mergers and acquisitions. Chapter 3 discusses the effects of earnings quality on the value 
and level of corporate cash holdings. 
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Chapter 2 
Earnings Quality and the Choice of Payment Method in Mergers and Acquisitions 
2.1 Introduction 
The choice of payment method in corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has 
been extensively studied in the literature. Some researchers indicate the choice is driven 
by the desire of the acquiring manager to maintain control of the acquiring firm (see, e.g., 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Stulz (1988), Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990), Ghosh and 
Ruland (1998)). Faccio and Masulis (2005) extend the argument and suggest that the 
payment method in M&As is largely a tradeoff between the threats of corporate control 
and financing constraints. Other researchers have related the choice of payment method 
in M&As to the asymmetric information between the acquiring firm and outsiders (see, 
e.g., Travlos (1987), Hansen (1987), Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Rhodes-Kropf; 
Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005), and Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh 
(2006)). It is generally argued that the acquiring firm will prefer stock financing when the 
acquiring manager believes his firm's stock is overvalued. Martin (1996) suggests that 
the choice of payment method in acquisitions is also affected by the acquiring firm's 
growth opportunities. Acquiring firms with high growth opportunities are more likely to 
use stock exchange as the payment method due to the desire to preserve cash for their 
investment needs. 
In this study, we add to the literature by showing that the choice of payment 
method in mergers and acquisitions is also significantly affected by the earnings quality 
of the acquiring firm. M&As are important managerial decisions. Managerial decisions 
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are likely to contain information about earnings quality because managers make decisions 
based on current and future earnings. Supporters of the efficient market hypothesis would 
argue that earnings quality is reflected in share value and thus its impact on the choice of 
financing in M&As is irrelevant. Indeed Francis et al. (2005), Aboody et al. (2005), and 
Chan et al. (2006) find that earnings (accruals) quality is priced in stock value. However, 
there is also significant empirical evidence that the market is surprised by earnings news 
quite frequently (see, e.g., Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002), Kasznik and McNichols 
(2002), and Doyle, Russell, Lundholm, and Soliman (2006)). Researchers of behavioral 
finance often suggest that investors are unable to correctly evaluate earnings information 
and that they react incorrectly to earnings news (see, e.g., Bernard and Thomas (1990), 
Barberis et al. (1998), and Daniel et al. (1998)). In addition, there is ample evidence that 
firms can influence reported earnings and that investors fail to respond instantaneously 
(see, e.g., Sloan (1996), Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b), and Xie (2001)). Thus, to the extent 
that the acquiring manager is more informative than investors about the earnings quality 
of the acquiring firm, the acquiring manager is likely to choose a payment method that 
enables him to take advantage of his superior information. In general it is likely that the 
acquiring manager tends to prefer cash (stock) financing when the earnings quality of the 
acquiring firm is high (low). Financing decisions made by the acquiring manager are also 
possibly influenced by the size of his ownership stake in the acquiring firm. The effect of 
managerial ownership on the choice of payment method in M&As, however, could be 
non-linear (see, e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and Lins (2003)). If the 
acquiring manager is more concerned about the value of his ownership stake than control 
benefits, the manager is likely to prefer cash (stock) as the medium of payment when the 
6 
earnings quality of the acquiring firm is high (low). If the acquiring manager is concerned 
about protecting both the value of his ownership stake and control benefits, we expect the 
acquiring manager to choose a payment method that is a combination of cash and stock in 
order to strike a balance between protecting personal wealth and not losing control of the 
company. In this scenario, more cash (stock) and less stock (cash) would be used when 
earnings quality is high (low). In the extreme case, if the acquiring manager does not 
want to give up any control benefits, it is possible that 100 percent cash financing is used 
even if the earnings quality of the acquiring firm is low. 
Our study is motivated by two strands of literature. First, a number of researchers 
have shown that earnings quality (accruals quality) plays a significant role in a multitude 
of corporate events (e.g., management buyouts (DeAngelo (1986) and Perry and 
Williams (1994)); initial public offerings of equity securities (Teoh, Welch, and Wong 
(1998a), Teoh and Wong (2002), DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefick (2004), and Lee and 
Masulis (2006)); seasoned equity offerings (Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b), Rangan 
(1998), Shivakumar (2000), and Jo, Kim, and Park (2007)); stock splits (Louis and 
Robinson (2005)); employee stock option reissues (Coles, Hertzel, and Kalpathy (2006)). 
Since control benefits and ownership stake are involved in M&As, it is conceivable that 
the acquiring manager has incentives to select a payment method that allows him to take 
advantage of his superior information about the earnings quality of the acquiring firm. 
The second strand of literature shows that there could be a direct link between 
corporate takeovers and earnings management (see, e.g., Erickson and Wang (1999) and 
Louis (2004)). The general conclusion in the literature on earnings management is that 
managers have strong incentives to influence the outcome of an event by altering accruals 
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in order to obtain better personal benefits. The findings of Erickson and Wang (1999) and 
Louis (2004) indicate acquiring firms pursue income increasing accruals manipulations in 
the quarter preceding a merger announcement. That is, earnings quality of acquiring firms 
could be subject to deliberate manipulations. Given the empirical evidence that investors 
are sometimes unable to understand earnings information correctly, we believe the 
acquiring manager has incentives to pick a payment method that reflects his knowledge 
of the firm's earnings quality. 
We have found three important results in this study. The first is that there is a 
significant negative relation between the earnings quality of the acquiring firm and the 
amount of cash paid in acquisitions. Firms with high (low) earnings quality use more 
cash (stock) in acquisition financing. The second important finding is that acquiring firms 
that have low insider ownership stakes use more cash in acquisition financing even if the 
earnings quality is poor. The observation implies that managers with low ownership 
stakes tend to avoid diluting their control of the acquiring firm when acquisitions take 
place. Unlike previous research, the third major finding of our study shows that high 
insider ownerships of acquiring firms do not have a significant impact on the amount of 
cash paid in acquisitions. Our third result suggests that for acquiring firms with high 
insider ownerships, the choice of payment method in acquisitions is likely affected by the 
effect of earnings quality on the personal wealth of the insiders. Our results are robust to 
different measures of earnings quality. In addition, using different econometric 
methodologies produce consistent results. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we review the literature that 
specifically links together earnings quality and mergers and acquisitions. In Section III, 
we develop our hypotheses. Empirical methods are presented in Sections IV and V. The 
sample construction is presented in Section VI. In Section VII, we present the results. A 
short summary is given in Section VIII. 
2.2 The Link between Earnings Quality and Mergers and Acquisitions 
Corporate decisions are generally made based on evaluations of current and future 
earnings. Thus it is likely that managerial decisions contain information about earnings 
quality. Recently, Li (2007) find empirical evidence that corporate investment decisions 
are positively related to earnings persistence. His results indicate that there is information 
contained in corporate investment decisions about earnings quality and that the 
information is uncorrelated with other conventional measures of earnings quality. Based 
on the results of Li (2007), it is reasonable to extrapolate that corporate M&As contain 
information about the earnings quality of the acquiring firm. To the extent that the 
acquiring manager is better informed than outsiders in determining the sustainability of 
the earnings growth following the acquisition, the acquiring manager is likely to choose 
the payment method he desires. 
Common accounting practices also suggest that earnings quality and managerial 
decisions are related. Managers exercise some discretion in computing earnings without 
violating generally accepted accounting principles. For example, firms can shift earnings 
to the current period from a subsequent period by accelerating revenue recognition and 
deferring expense recognition. Alternatively, firms can affect earnings by changing 
methods of inventory accounting, revising estimated numbers such as bad debt expense, 
or a variety of other techniques. The belief that firms manage accounting earnings by 
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altering accruals is widely accepted by users of financial statements and is supported by a 
growing body of academic research. 
Several published papers motivate our proposition that earnings quality is 
important in determining the choice of payment method in mergers and acquisitions. 
These papers show that management of earnings may be a common occurrence when the 
control of a company changes hands. Perry and Williams (1994) examine a sample of 
175 management buyouts (MBOs) during the period between 1981 and 1988 and find 
negative discretionary accruals in the year preceding the MBO. Despite corporate 
managers have a legal duty to seek the best possible price for their firms; the authors 
argue that personal economic stakes may motivate managers to depress pre-buyout 
accounting earnings so that they could get a more favorable purchase price for the 
buyout. Wu (1997) uses the sample of management buyouts in DeAngelo (1986) and 
finds evidence that managers understate accounting earnings in the period immediately 
before the buyout so as to underpay the public shareholders for the transaction. He 
estimated that the average gain for managers is about $50 million for the sample firms. 
Direct evidence of earnings management involving third-party takeovers are reported by 
Erickson and Wang (1999) and Louis (2004). Erickson and Wang report results that are 
consistent with income increasing accruals manipulation by acquiring firms in the period 
prior to the announcement of the merger agreement, and that the degree of accruals 
manipulation is an increasing function of the economic benefits at stake in the merger. In 
addition, they find no such evidence for cash mergers. Louis (2004) also report evidence 
that acquiring firms overstate their earnings in the quarter preceding a merger 
announcement. 
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In sum, there is ample evidence that corporate investment decisions may contain 
information about earnings quality. Mergers and acquisitions, being significant events in 
the history of a firm, represent excellent opportunities for researchers to investigate the 
earnings quality information impounded by acquiring managers. 
2.3 Hypotheses Development 
Following Faccio and Masulis (2005), we focus on the acquiring firm's financing 
choices though the target firm can also exert its influences. It is argued by Faccio and 
Masulis that for a deal to succeed, the financial structure of the deal must be acceptable to 
the bidding firm. In addition, the bidder is likely to have strong preferences toward one 
financial structure over another because control threats are involved. If the bidder is not 
satisfied with the target firm's financing choice, the deal may be aborted or else the 
acquiring firm can make a hostile takeover on its own terms. 
Next, we explain how earnings quality is relevant to the existing hypotheses in the 
literature regarding the choice of payment method in acquisitions. We then develop our 
own hypotheses. 
2.3.1 Earnings Quality and Asymmetric Information 
The asymmetric information theory has been used in explaining the choice of 
payment method in acquisitions. It is generally argued that if the acquiring manager is 
better informed than outside investors about the value of the acquiring firm, the manager 
will prefer stock financing of an acquisition when he believes the acquiring firm's stock 
is overvalued. Some recent studies have found evidence that firms engage in waves of 
acquisitions when their common equities are over-valued, and such acquirers typically 
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use stock as the medium of payment in acquisitions (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003), Rhodes-Kropf; Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005), and Dong, Hirshleifer, 
Richardson, and Teoh, (2006)). 
To the extent that the acquiring manager is better informed than other 
stakeholders about the earnings quality of the acquiring firm, poorer (better) earnings 
quality makes the private information of firm managers more valuable and the 
information asymmetry between acquirers and other stakeholders more pertinent. The 
acquiring manager is conceivably in a better position to determine if the earnings quality 
is going to be poorer (better) after the acquisition. The acquiring manager is also likely to 
have more information than others in determining the sustainability of earnings growth 
after the acquisition. Despite some researchers (see, e.g., Francis et al. (2005), Aboody et 
al. (2005), and Chan et al. (2006)) indicate that earnings quality is reflected in share 
value, the empirical evidence that investors are unable to understand earnings information 
and react correctly suggests that the acquiring manager's insights regarding earnings 
quality is relevant in his choice of payment method in M&As. In general, we expect the 
acquiring manager to prefer cash (stock) as the medium of payment when the earnings 
quality of the acquiring firm is high (low). Paying cash for acquisitions when earnings 
quality is high helps the manager retain the gain under his control. On the other hand, 
using stock financing in M&As when earnings quality is low transfers potential losses to 
other parties. An implicit assumption underlying our argument is that the acquiring 
manager is better informed and is thus capable of assessing more correctly the effect of 
earnings quality on the share value before and after the acquisition. This implicit 
assumption, however, is not inconsistent with the implication of the abundant empirical 
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evidence presented by researchers that show acquiring managers are able to recognize 
temporary market misvaluations and use overvalued equities to finance acquisitions (see, 
e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005)). 
Hypothesis 1: The acquiring manager prefers cash (stock) as the acquisition 
payment method when the acquiring firm's earnings quality is high (low). 
2.3.2 Earnings Quality and Managerial Ownership 
A typical characteristic of the publicly traded firms in the United States is the 
separation of ownership from control, which gives rise to agency conflicts between 
managers and shareholders (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Managers with a 
significant ownership in their firm who wish to retain control will tend to finance 
acquisitions with cash (or debt) rather than with stock in order to avoid diluting their 
control and risk losing it (see, e.g., Stulz (1988) and Jung, Kim, and Stulz (1995)). 
Amihud et al. (1990) and Ghosh and Ruland (1998) find empirical evidence supporting 
this hypothesis. However, there is evidence that the effect of managerial ownership on 
the likelihood of stock financing is non-linear (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)). 
Denis et al. (1997) and Lins (2003) find evidence that the interests of the managers are 
not sufficiently aligned with those of the shareholders when managerial holdings are 
small (less than 5%) or relatively large (more than 20%). It is suggested that managerial 
entrenchment effects dominate incentive alignment effects in both cases. 
With the presence of agency problems, earnings quality of the acquiring firm 
could affect the manager's choice of payment method through its effect on the value of 
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the manager's stockholding. We hypothesize that in cases where managerial 
entrenchment dominate, the acquiring manager prefers cash over stock as the payment 
method even if the acquiring firm's earnings quality is poor. This happens because 
control benefits are more important than other considerations. In contrast, in situations in 
which the manager is concerned about the value of his ownership stake rather than the 
benefits of control, the manager would prefer cash (stock) in acquisition financing when 
the acquiring firm's earnings quality is high (low). Finally, in situations where the 
acquiring manager is concerned about protecting the value of his ownership stake as well 
as the benefits of control, the choice of payment method is a combination of stock and 
cash that depends on the acquiring firm's earnings quality. When the earnings quality is 
low, we expect the manager to use a payment method that has more stock and less cash. 
When the earnings quality is high, we expect the manager to use more cash and less stock 
to pay for the target. These payment choices allow the acquiring manager to strike a 
balance between protecting personal wealth and not losing control of the firm. 
Hypothesis 2: With the value of managerial ownership at stake, the acquiring 
manager's chosen acquisition payment method reflects a trade-off between personal 
wealth and control benefits. Entrenched managers prefer cash over stock as the 
acquisition payment method even if the acquiring firm's earnings quality is poor. In 
situations where the acquiring manager wants to strike a balance between protecting the 
value of his stock ownership as well as control benefits, the chosen payment method 
would be a combination that has more (less) cash and less (more) stock if the earnings 
quality is high (low). 
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2.4 Measures of Earnings Quality 
There is no agreed-upon metric for the earnings quality construct. Two general 
approaches are used in existing research for measuring earnings quality. The first 
approach measures earnings quality by examining properties of observed accounting 
numbers. The measures based on this approach are typically related to the level of 
accruals (Sloan (1996)); the estimation error in accruals (Dechow and Dichev (2002)); 
and earnings variability (Francis et al. (2004,2005)). The second approach focuses on the 
association between earnings and stock returns (see, e.g., Francis and Schipper (1999) 
and Ecker, Francis, Kim, Olsson, and Schipper (2006)). This approach extracts 
information about earnings from stock prices by assuming the market is efficient. In this 
study, we follow the first approach in using accounting measures to describe the earnings 
quality of a firm because these measures have been used extensively in the literature and 
have been shown to have significant market effects (Francis et al. 2004, 2005). 
2.4.1 Accruals Quality (AQ) 
Our first measure of earnings quality is accruals quality. Accruals quality, AQ, is 
measured by the standard deviation of residuals from regressions relating accruals to cash 
flows over a multi-year period before the merger. A high (low) standard deviation implies 
a low (high) accruals quality. Our method, following Francis et al. (2005), is based on the 
cross-sectional Dechow-Dichev (2002) model and augmented with the fundamental 
variables from the modified Jones model, namely, PPE and change in revenues (all 
variables are scaled by lagged assets): 
TCAJf = </>0j + 4 ,j CFOJM + fcjCFOj, + fcjCFOj^ + </>AjA Re v„ + jSJPPEu + v,., 
(Eq.l) 
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Where TCAj>t= (ACAj,t-ACLj,r ACashj,t+ASTDEBTj,t )= total current accruals in year t, 
CFOjt = NIBEjt,- TAjt = firm j ' s cash flow from operations in year t, NIBEj>t = firm j ' s 
net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18) in year t, TAj)t= (ACAj>rACLjt-
ACashjjt+ ASTDEBTj>t -DEPNj,t) = firm j ' s total accruals in year t, ACAj>t = firm j ' s 
change in current assets (Compustat #4) between year t-1 and year t, ACLj t = firm j ' s 
change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) between year t-1 and year t, firm j ' s change 
ACashjt in cash (Compustat #1) between year t-1 and year t, ASTDEBTjt = firm j ' s 
change in debt in current liabilities (Compustat #34) between year t-1 and year t, DEPNjt 
= firm j ' s depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat #14) in year t, ARevjt = 
firm j ' s change in revenues (Compustat #12) between year t-1 and year t, PPEj t = firm j ' s 
gross value of PPE (Compustat #7) in year t. 
We first estimate Equation (1) for each industry in year t. Annual cross-sectional 
estimations of (1) are then performed to yield firm- and year-specific residuals, which 
form our accruals quality metric: AQjt = cr(vj)t is the standard deviation of firm j ' s 
residuals (vj)t calculated over years t - 4 through t. Larger standard deviations of residuals 
indicate poorer accruals quality. Unlike abnormal accruals generated by the modified 
Jones (1991) model, the AQ proxy employed by Francis et al. has an advantage of taking 
uncertainty into consideration so that a firm that has consistently large residuals may still 
has a good accruals quality because there is no uncertainty about its accruals. We 
calculate values of AQ t
 = cy(vj)t for all firms with available data on Compustat for the 
period from 1991 to 2004 and then merge with our initial sample obtained from Thomson 
One Banker. Because o(Vj)t is based on five annual residuals, our sample has to restrict to 
firms with at least 7 years of data. For our sample, the mean and median values of AQ are 
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0.051 and 0.038, respectively. These values are consistent with the ones (mean and 
median values of 0.044 and 0.031) reported by Francis et al. (2005). 
2.4.2 Innate and Discretionary Accruals Quality 
The second measure of earnings quality is related to the components of accruals 
quality. Accruals quality could be driven by a firm's innate features such as the business 
strategy and operating environment. Accruals quality could also be affected by 
managerial discretion. According to the Dechow-Dichev model there are five innate 
factors affecting accruals quality: firm size (Size, measured as the log of total assets), 
standard deviation of cash flow from operations (a(CFO)), standard deviation of sales 
revenues (cr(Sales)), length of operating cycle (OperCycle, measured as the sum of days 
accounts receivable and days inventory) and incidence of negative earnings realizations 
(NegEarn). We expect smaller firms and firms with higher cash flow volatility, higher 
sales revenue volatility, longer length of operating cycle, or higher frequency of losses to 
have poorer accruals quality. 
To find the innate component of accruals quality, we regress AQ on the five 
innate indicators by year (Equation 2). The residual from Equation 2 form the 
discretionary component of accruals quality. The predicted values from Equation 2 yield 
the innate AQ (Equation 3). 
AQj t = A0 + X^Sizej, + A2a(CFO)Jt + Aj jCr(Sales)Jt + A,4Log(OperCycle)Jt + ASJNegEarnjt + /xJt 
(Eq.2) 
InnateAQj, = A0 + AxSizej t + A2a(CFO)j, + A3 j<r(Sales)j, + A4Log(OperCycle) jt + X5jNegEarnjl 
(Eq.3) 
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where Size is measured as the log of total assets, a(CFO) is the standard deviation of 
cash flow from operations over the past 5 years, rj(Sales) is the standard deviation of 
sales revenues over the past 5 years, Log (OperCycle) is measured as the log of sum of 
days accounts receivable and days inventory, and NegEarn is the number of years out of 
the past 5 that shows a negative earnings. We measure each of the five innate indicators 
on a firm-specific basis, using rolling 5-year windows.1 The mean coefficient estimates 
from the annual regression of Eq.2 (13 annual) are similar to those reported by Francis 
(2005) with 32 annual coefficient estimates. All five innate factors have the expected 
signs (i.e., Size is negatively related to accruals quality, and all the other 4 indicators are 
positively related to accruals quality). 
2.4.3 Absolute Abnormal Accruals 
The third measure of earnings quality is the absolute value of abnormal accruals 
(AQ2) based on the modified Jones (1991) model. First, we estimate the following cross-
sectional regression for each of the Fama-French (1997) 48 industry groups with at least 
20 firms in year t: 
TAJt I Asset,_,_, = /?, * 1 / Asset j _,_, + fi2 * A Re vJt I Asset y>(_, + /?3 * PPEJt I Asset y,_, + sj, (Eq. 4) 
The industry- and year-specific parameter estimates obtained are then used to estimate 
firm-specific normal accruals (NA) as a percentage of lagged total assets: 
NAj, =j3l*l/AssetJt_1+j82*ARevJl/Assetjl_l +J33 *PPEjtlAsset,,_, + ejt (Eq. 5) 
1 Francis et al. (2005) use a 10-year rolling window for their 32-year analysis, and conclude that their 
results are not sensitive to the length of the window used to measure the innate factors. We choose a 5-year 
rolling window given the length of our sample period from 1991 to 2004. 
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Absolute abnormal accruals in year t is equal to the absolute value of the difference 
between the firm-specific actual accruals and the estimated normal accruals. 
2.4.4 Earnings Variability 
The fourth measure of earnings quality, earnings variability (EARNVAR), is the 
standard deviation of the firm's earnings over the seven years before the acquisition. 
Earnings is defined as earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Similar 
to the interpretation of the standard deviation of accruals quality, higher earnings 
variability is equivalent to lower earnings quality. 
2.5 The Endogeneity between Earnings Quality and Payment Method 
It is likely that earnings quality and the choice of payment method in acquisitions 
are endogenously determined. The choice of payment method is affected by earnings 
quality because of the effect of earnings quality on stock value. But researchers have also 
shown that acquiring firms manage their earnings to inflate the share price before making 
stock-financed acquisitions (e.g., Erickson and Wang (1999) and Louis (2003)). That is, 
earnings quality is affected by the acquiring firm's choice of payment method. Given the 
endogeneity between earnings quality and the choice of payment method in acquisitions, 
we use the following simultaneous equations in this study. 
%Cash = EARN_QUAL + FINLEVER + ASSETS + RUNJJP + RELSIZE + MTB + 
INDR + UNLISTED_TGT + SUBSID + BLOCK + INSIDER<5+ INSIDER>20 + 
INSIDER<5 *EARN_QUAL + INSIDER>20*EARN_QUAL Equation (6.1) 
EARN_QUAL = %Cash + FINLEVER + ASSETS + RELSIZE + MTB + 
INSIDER_OWN + DIVDEND Equation (6.2) 
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Eight different versions of the model are made in order to facilitate testing the 
hypotheses developed. The %Cash variable is the percentage of cash used in the chosen 
payment method. EARNQUAL is earnings quality and is measured by the four proxies 
described earlier (accruals quality, discretionary accruals quality, earnings variability, and 
absolute abnormal accruals). FINLEVER is financial leverage of the acquiring firm. It is 
the acquirer's total debt before the acquisition divided by total assets. A higher leverage 
lowers the likelihood of using cash financing (Faccio and Masulis (2005)). ASSETS is 
measured as the log of total assets. Larger bidders are more likely to choose cash 
financing in acquisitions because their higher debt capacity makes it easier to raise cash. 
RUNUP is measured as the one-year buy and hold stock return of the bidder before the 
acquisition. Acquirers prefer to pay with stock when the stock is believed to be 
overvalued (e.g., Myers and Majluf (1984) and Martin (1996)). RELSIZE is measured as 
the deal size relative to the sum of the acquirer's pre-acquisition market capitalization 
plus the deal size. Acquirers prefer stock financing for large acquisitions because of the 
related information asymmetry (Hansen (1987)). MTB is the market-to-book ratio of 
equity prior to the acquisition. Martin (1996) finds that bidders with high growth 
opportunities (high market-to-book) prefer stock financing in acquisitions. INDR is a 
(0,1) dummy variable to measure the industry relatedness of the merging firms. It has a 
value of 1 if the firms are in the same 2-digit SIC code, and equals 0 otherwise. The 
target firm is more likely to accept stock financing as the payment method in a same-
industry merger because of the relatively lower level of information asymmetry. 
UNLISTED_TGT is a (0,1) dummy variable that has a value of 1 if the target is a stand-
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alone unlisted firm, and is 0 otherwise. An unlisted target is likely to prefer cash payment 
in acquisitions (Faccio and Masulis (2005)). SUB SID is a (01) dummy variable that has a 
value of 1 if the unlisted target is a subsidiary of another firm, and is 0 otherwise. A 
target firm that is an unlisted subsidiary would prefer cash financing in an acquisition 
because of the concern about liquidity needs. INSIDEROWN is the percentage 
ownership of the company stock owned by insiders. Managerial ownership is related to 
the probability of stock financing in acquisitions (Martin (1996)). BLOCK is a (01) 
dummy variable that has a value of 1 if outside blockholders owning more than 5% of the 
stock are reported in Compact Disclosure or SEC filings on Lexis-Nexis, and is 0 
otherwise. INSIDER<5 is a (01) dummy variable that has a value of 1 if the insider 
ownership of the company stock is less than 5%, and is 0 otherwise. INSIDER>20 is a 
(01) dummy variable that has a value of 1 if the insider ownership of the company stock 
is greater than 20%, and is 0 otherwise. DIVIDEND is measured as total dividends 
divided by net income. Firms with high dividend payouts are less likely to use cash 
financing in acquisitions. 
In equation (6.2) of the simultaneous estimation model, earnings quality is 
affected by a number of variables in addition to the payment method (%Cash). Financial 
leverage is a control variable because firms might increase earnings management when 
they are close to violating debt covenants (Jo et al. (2007)). ASSETS and MTB are 
control variables because Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and Zmijewski and Hagerman 
(1981) find that large and/or high-growth firms have greater incentives to engage in 
earnings management. We include RELSIZE as an independent variable given Erickson 
and Wang (1999) find that the degree of accruals manipulation is an increasing function 
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of the economic benefits at stake in the merger. Earnings quality is affected by insider 
ownership (INSIDEROWN) of the firm due to the personal benefits at stake (see, e.g., 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Coles et al. (2006)). Finally, DIVDIENDS is 
included because some firms have the incentive to manage earnings given their desire to 
maintain a smooth dividend payout (Kasanen et al. (1996). 
2.6 Sample Construction 
The sample consists of mergers and acquisitions announced by publicly traded 
U.S. companies between January 1993 and December 2004, inclusively. We select the 
sample period depending upon the data availability of certain variables. For example, the 
earliest availability of insider ownership data can be only traced back to 1992 when 
Compact Disclosure started to release insider ownership data through proxy statements. 
Since we need to use insider ownership data before the merger announcement, we have to 
restrict our sample period starting from January 1993. 
Our sample is obtained from the Security Data Company (SDC) Merger and 
Acquisition database. Because our sample only includes publicly traded firms, this 
excludes transactions such as leveraged buyouts and management buyouts. To be 
included in our sample, an eligible transaction must satisfy the following criteria: 
1) The merger was successfully completed. 
2) The acquirer must be a publicly traded firm. 
3) The acquiring firm is a non-financial and non-utility firm. We follow Louis 
(2004) to exclude firms with SIC codes between 4400 and 5000(regulated) and 
between 6000 and 6500 (Financial). 
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4) Information of the deal value and method of payment information is available. 
The acquirer has the necessary annual data on Compustat to compute AQ, innate 
AQ, discretionary AQ, Earning Variability and other control variables. 
5) Ownership information of the acquiring firm is available either from proxy 
statements of Compact Disclosure or SEC fillings through LexisNexis Academic. 
6) The acquiring firm has the necessary data on CRSP to compute the one-year buy-
and-hold return (RUNUP) prior to announcement. 
Given the data required to construct the various measures of earnings quality and the 
availability of ownership data, only 786 M&As meet the requirements. Our sample size is 
comparable to the 373 observations of either pure stock swaps or pure cash purchases 
between 1992 and 2000 in Louis (2004). For our sample, the number of observations in 
each year ranges from 19 to 122. In Panel A of Table 1, we report the distribution of the 
sample per industry, and in Panel B of Table 1, we present the distribution of the sample 
by year. 
[Table 1 about here] 
2.7 Results 
2.7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for the variables in the simultaneous estimation model are 
reported in Table 2. Our sample contains 391 (49.7%) pure stock deals, 194 (24.7%) pure 
cash deals, and 201 (25.6%) mixed payment deals. For the sake of comparison, we focus 
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on the descriptive statistics by payment method in panel B. Accruals quality (AQ), 
measured as the standard deviation of residuals, is the lowest for pure stock-financed 
deals (that is, the highest standard deviation) among the three financing types with a 
mean (median) of 0.059(0.046). The mean (median) accruals quality is 0.038 (0.026) for 
cash-financed deals; and 0.049 (0.031) for mixed-financed deals. Earnings variability 
(EARNVAR) exhibits similar characteristics that it has a higher mean (median) of 
0.078(0.055) for pure stock offers than the mean (median) of 0.052(0.032) for pure cash 
offers. Regarding the size of absolute abnormal accruals (AQ2), pure stock offers also 
have a higher mean (median) of 0.062 (0.054) than the mean (median) of 0.047 (0.037) 
for pure cash offers. Innate accruals quality for stock-financed acquirers has a mean 
(median) standard deviation of 0.028 (0.025), the quality is lower than those for cash-
financed and mixed-financed acquisitions. Discretionary accruals quality is also the 
lowest in stock-financed acquisitions with a mean (median) standard deviation of 0.031 
(0.021). In sum, all the various measures of earnings quality show that pure stock offers 
are related to lower earnings quality and pure cash offers are related to higher earnings 
quality, and mixed offers on average have an earnings quality that is in between. These 
numbers lend initial support to our hypothesis that earnings quality has a significant 
impact on acquisition payment method. On average, the acquirers in stock-financed deals 
are smaller than the acquirers in cash-financed deals. The mean (median) total assets for 
the two groups are $5977 ($1840) million and $8727 ($4000) million respectively. 
Acquirers making mixed-financing acquisitions have mean (median) total assets of $5463 
($2765) million. We control for the effect of firm size of the acquirer in our model. 
Financial leverage (FINLEVER) of cash-financed acquirers is higher than that for stock-
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acquirers. The mean (median) FINLEVER is 15.0% (12.7%) for stock-acquirers, and 
19.0% (19.7%) for cash-acquirers. The average financial leverage is reasonably low that 
it may not have imposed a constraint on the choice of payment method for our sample of 
mergers and acquisitions. Average DEAL VALUE for stock-financed acquisitions is 
much larger than that for cash-financed deals. The mean (median) deal value for the two 
groups are $1065 ($714) million and $370 ($112) million respectively. The one-year buy-
and-hold stock return (RUNJUP) prior to the acquisition is the highest for stock-financed 
acquisitions with a mean (median) of 103.9% (34.8%). The cash-financed acquirers have 
a significantly smaller RUN_UP with a mean (median) of only 28.9% (18.0%). Growth 
opportunities (market-to-book ratio) are the highest for stock-financed acquirers among 
the three financing types with a mean (median) of 5.69 (3.89); cash-financed acquirers 
have the lowest market-to-book ratio with a mean (median) of 0.29 (0.18). Regarding 
insider equity ownership, INSIDER_OWN, the mean (median) value is 0.377 (0.075) for 
stock-payers and 0.332 (0.052) for cash-payers. Block ownership has a mean (median) of 
0.185 (0.098) for pure stock offers, pure cash and mixed offers have comparable levels of 
block ownership. For our sample, stock-financed deals involve more often than cash-
financed deals targets that are stand-alone unlisted firms or subsidiaries of other 
companies. 
[Table 2 about here] 
In Table 3, we divide the sample firms into five quintiles by earnings quality and 
report the mean value of cash paid (%Cash) by acquiring firms in each quintile. 
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Acquiring firms with the highest AQ quality (quintile 1) have a mean %Cash paid that is 
about two times higher than those of acquiring firms with the lowest AQ quality (quintile 
5). The difference is 22.32% and is significant at 1%. Similar statistics are observed for 
other measures of earnings quality. The results in Table 3 show that acquiring firms with 
higher earnings quality pay significantly more cash for their targets than acquirers with 
lowest earnings quality. This is consistent with the prediction of hypothesis 1. 
[Tables 3 about here] 
2.7.2 Full Model Regressions Results 
Table 4 presents the results of the simultaneous equations models. Results for 
equation 6.1 are presented in columns 1 to 8, and results for equation 6.2 are presented in 
the last two columns. All the eight models are significant at p < 0.001. The adjusted R2 
values are 0.15 or higher. In columns 1 to 8, we find that AQ is significantly negatively 
related to %Cash, that is, low accruals quality (high standard deviation) significantly 
reduces the amount of cash paid. The coefficient on AQ is significant at the 5% level in 
all the eight models. The finding supports our hypothesis 1 that acquiring firms with poor 
earnings quality prefer stock over cash as the payment method in acquisitions. In column 
1, the coefficients on FINLEVER, ASSETS, RUNJJP, RELSIZE, MTB, INDR, and 
SUBSID have the expected signs. Unlike Faccio and Masulis (2005), the coefficient on 
UNLISTED_TGT is negative for our sample. INSIDER_OWN, as an aggregate measure, 
is insignificant in column 1. Given that stock-financed acquisitions typically reduce the 
wealth of the acquiring firm's shareholders, the likelihood of choosing stock as the 
payment method in acquisitions should be lower when block ownership is higher. The 
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positive coefficient on BLOCK supports this argument. In column 2, INSIDEROWN is 
replaced by INSIDER<5 and INSIDER>20. The coefficient on INSIDER<5 is positive 
but insignificant. Researchers generally find that firms with a low or high insider 
ownership are likely to suffer from agency problems. Firms with higher insider 
ownerships are likely to make cash-financed acquisitions in order to avoid dilution of 
ownership (see, e.g., Amihud, Lev, and Travlos (1990) and Chang and Mais (2000)). In 
Table 4, the coefficient on Insider>20 is insignificant. It suggests that managers with 
significant insider holdings do not necessarily prefer cash-financed acquisitions if the 
values of their stock holdings are affected by the earnings quality of the acquiring firm. 
For acquiring managers with high ownership stakes, it is likely that the choice of 
payment method is a balance between protecting the personal wealth and not losing 
control of the firm. This finding supports the prediction of our second hypothesis. 
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, we examine how accruals quality interacts with 
insider ownership in affecting the choice of payment method in acquisitions. When the 
effect of insider ownership is only channeled through the interaction with AQ, as in 
column 4, the coefficient on INSIDER<5*AQ is significantly positive at the 10% level. 
That is, there is some evidence that managers with low ownerships prefer cash over stock 
in financing acquisitions even though the acquiring firm's accruals quality is bad. This 
finding supports the prediction of hypothesis 2. The entrenchment by acquiring managers 
with low insider ownership stakes, INSIDER<5, is more clear in columns 5 and 6. The 
coefficient on INSIDER<5*MTB is positive and significant at 10% and 5% in column 5 
and 6, respectively. That is, for acquiring firms that have high growth opportunities, the 
entrenched managers still prefer pay cash over stock as the payment method even when 
27 
cash should be preserved for investment activities. In columns 5 and 6, the coefficient on 
INSIDER>20*MTB is insignificant. It confirms our earlier observation that acquiring 
firms with high insider ownership stakes do not always prefer higher levels of cash 
financing with the intention to retain control. In columns 7 and 8, we consider the 
interactions among insider ownership, growth opportunities, and accruals quality. 
Consistent with the earlier results, the coefficient on INSIDER<5*MTB*AQ is 
significantly positive at the 10% level in column 8. Also consistent with the other 
columns, the coefficient on the interaction variable INSIDER>20 *MTB*AQ is 
insignificant. 
[Table 4 about here] 
2.7.3 Reduced-form Regressions Results 
In Table 4, although most of the coefficients have the expected signs, some are 
insignificant in all the eight models. Hahn and Hausman (2002) show that if the degree of 
endogeneity is not strong enough, statistical inference based on simultaneous equation 
systems will pose a significant bias. Donald and Newey (2001) and Stock et al. (2002) 
recommend using only the strong variables in a reduced-form regression model. Thus, we 
re-estimate our model using only the significant variables and report the results in Table 
5. Consistent with the results in Table 4, the coefficient on AQ is negative and significant 
at 5% in each of the eight models. That is, acquiring firms with poor accruals quality 
(high standard deviations) prefer stock over cash for financing acquisitions. The evidence 
of managerial entrenchment among acquiring firms with lower insider ownership stakes, 
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INSIDER<5, has become stronger in Table 5. INSIDER<5 in column 2 is significant at 
10%; INSIDER<5*AQ in column 4 is significant at 10%; INSIDER<5*MTB is 
significant at 5% in column 6; and INSIDER<5*MTB*AQ is significant at 5% in column 
8. The observation in column 8 clearly shows that entrenched insiders opt for cash-
financed acquisitions despite earnings quality and growth opportunities suggest the 
opposite. Also similar to the findings in Table 4, the reduced form regressions in Table 5 
show that acquiring firms with high ownership stakes, INSIDER>20, do not necessary 
prefer higher levels of cash payment for acquisitions when the impact of earnings quality 
on personal wealth is taken into consideration. In sum, the results reported in Tables 4 
and 5 confirm that earnings quality has a significant impact on the choice of payment 
method in acquisitions. Therefore, the potential weak endogeneity problem does not 
change our inferences concerning the simultaneous relation between earnings quality and 
the choice of payment method in acquisitions. 
[Table 5 about here] 
2.7.4 Robustness Tests 
The first robustness test that we perform is to substitute AQ with 
discretionary AQ (DISCAQ) which is estimated from discretionary accruals alone. Due 
to the weak endogeneity concern, we conduct our robustness tests using reduced form 
equations only. The results presented in Table 6 are consistent and similar to those 
reported in Tables 4 and 5. The coefficient on DISCAQ is negative and significant in all 
the 8 models. Evidence of managerial entrenchment continues to exist among managers 
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with low insider ownership stakes (INSIDER<5), as shown by the various interaction 
variables with AQ. In unreported results, we considered two other proxies for accruals 
quality. The first is the standard deviation of residuals (AQ1) using the unmodified 
Dechow-Dichev model. This unmodified regression excludes the change in revenues and 
PPE as independent variables. The second additional proxy is the absolute value of 
abnormal accruals (AQ2) estimated according to the modified Jones (1991) model. The 
results obtained by using the AQ proxy from the unmodified Dechow-Dichev model are 
consistent and similar to those reported in Tables 4, 5, and 6. Surprisingly, the 
coefficient on AQ2 is not significant in all the eight models. A possible explanation is 
that in a standard asymmetric information framework, the size of abnormal accruals 
before the merger has limited impact on the choice of the payment method. The typical 
situation for accruals management to occur is when the user of accounting information is 
uninformed or unsophisticated. In corporate takeovers, the user of accounting information 
is not uninformed. On the contrary, managers of the target firm are informed users of 
accounting information, and are likely familiar with the techniques of accruals 
management. Because managers of the target firm are subject to potential legal liabilities 
if they do not perform fiduciary duties on behalf of the target shareholders, they have 
strong incentives to make sure that the financial information of the acquiring firm is not 
subject to manipulations. In such a situation, short-term accruals management before the 
merger may not have taken place at all. Even if they do happen, their magnitudes may be 
relatively restrained and their effects on the choice of payment method reduced because 
the information asymmetries between acquirers and targets are not effective. Thus, the 
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size of short-term abnormal accruals may have less impact on the choice of payment 
method in M&As. 
[Table 6 about here] 
In Table 7, we report robustness test results where earnings quality is measured by 
earnings variability (EARNVAR). Unlike the results using AQ, the coefficient on 
EARNVAR itself is only marginally significant in column 8. However, previous 
conclusions regarding the interactive variables involving insider ownership and earnings 
quality persist in Table 7. That is, acquiring firms with low insider ownership stakes 
(INSIDER<5) show some evidence of preferring higher levels of cash payment in M&As 
(in columns 4, 5, 6, and 8) whereas those with high insider ownership stakes 
(INSIDER>20) do not necessary prefer cash over stock when earnings quality is 
considered (in columns 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8). 
[Table 7 about here] 
The other major robustness test is the use of Tobit models instead of simultaneous 
equations. The dependent variable in a Tobit model is both left and right censored. In our 
case, the percentage of cash paid (%Cash) is bounded in the interval (0,100) and suits 
Tobit models very well. The Tobit regression model is appropriate when the dependent 
variable is censored at some upper or/and lower bound as an artifact of how the data are 
measured. Tobit models are estimated with maximum likelihood estimation, a general 
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method for obtaining parameter estimates and performing statistical inference on the 
estimates. The results are reported in Tables 8 and 9. 
In these Tobit regressions, the effect of earnings quality is much stronger than 
those reported using simultaneous regressions. In Table 8, the coefficient on AQ alone is 
negative and significant at the 1% level in all the eight columns. The interaction variable 
INSIDER<5*AQ, is significant at the 1% level in columns 3 and 4, and 
INSIDER<5*MTB*AQ in column 8 is significant at 10%. These findings provide 
stronger evidence supporting our hypotheses that earnings quality affects the choice of 
payment method in acquisitions. In the Tobit models of Table 9, earnings quality is 
measured by EARNVAR. The coefficient on EARNVAR itself is significant at the 5% 
level in 7 out of 8 columns. The interaction variables involving insider ownership and 
EARNVAR have coefficients similar to those reported in earlier tables. That is, acquiring 
firms with low insider ownership stakes (INSIDER<5) prefer higher levels of cash 
payment in M&As (in columns 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8) whereas those with higher insider 
ownership stakes (INSIDER>20) do not necessary prefer cash over stock when earnings 
quality is considered (in columns 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8). In sum, the results of the Tobit 
models give a stronger support to the predictions of our two hypotheses. 
[Tables 8 and 9 about here] 
2.8 Summary 
The intention of accounting standard regulators in allowing some degree of 
reporting flexibility is to provide enough latitude so that financial statements can be more 
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informative. Nevertheless, in a world of asymmetric information and agency problems, 
the discretionary nature of accrual accounting can lead to earnings manipulation. Firms 
have been found to use discretionary accounting choices to manage earnings information 
around the time of mergers and acquisitions. In this study, we show that the choice of 
payment method in acquisitions is significantly affected by the acquiring firm's earnings 
quality. We find that acquiring firms with poor earnings quality prefer a lower cash 
payment in acquisitions, but acquiring managers with low insider ownership stakes prefer 
cash over stock even if the earnings quality is poor. We also find that acquiring firms 
with high insider ownership stakes do not always prefer paying more cash for 
acquisitions. For them, it is likely that the choice of payment method in acquisitions is to 
maintain a balance between protecting personal wealth and not losing control of the 
acquiring firm. The existing literature has related the choice of payment method in 
acquisitions to factors such as growth opportunities, stock price performance, corporate 
control, managerial equity ownership, and target size. We contribute to the literature by 
showing that the earnings quality of the acquiring firm is also an important factor. 
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Chapter3 
Earnings Quality and Corporate Cash Holdings 
3.1 Introduction 
Poor earnings quality, regardless of its definition, displeases investors. Despite 
there is argument whether earnings quality, when measured as accruals quality, is 
systematically priced in the stock market (Francis et al., 2004 and 2005; Core, Guay, and 
Verdi, 2008), researchers have linked earnings quality to a multitude of corporate events 
(see Dechow and Schrand, 2004 for a summary). A recurrent theme in extant literature is 
that poor earnings quality is associated with agency problems and earnings management 
(Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998a and 1998b; Teoh and Wong 2002; DuCharme, 
Malatesta, and Sefick, 2004; Louis, 2004; Jo, Kim, and Park, 2007). In this study, we add 
to the literature by studying the effect of poor earnings quality on corporate cash 
holdings. We argue that poor earnings quality implies a lack of reliable information for 
investors to monitor firm managers, and it may also imply a higher likelihood that 
earnings are managed. Thus, we postulate that poor earnings quality has a negative effect 
on the value of corporate cash holdings. We argue that the negative effect arises because 
in a world of asymmetric information and agency problems, investors discount the value 
of corporate cash holdings based on their expectations of how the cash would be used. 
We also postulate that poor earnings quality aggravates the information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders of the firm. As information asymmetry makes raising 
external equity funds more expensive, firms have incentives to hold more cash. We 
examine cash due to several reasons. First, there is evidence that the cash reserves held 
by U.S. firms have increased substantially in the last two decades. According to Bates, 
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Kahle, and Stulz (2006), the median cash-to-assets ratio for 13237 U.S. industrial firms 
has increased from 5.5% to 14.73% between 1980 and 2004. Second, as Myers and 
Rajan (1998) suggest, liquid assets can be turned into private benefits for firm managers 
at lower cost than other assets. More liquid assets can lead to increased agency problems. 
Thus, cash holdings represent a good target for examining the implications of the agency 
problems associated with poor earnings quality on firm value. 
Our study is motivated by two strands of recent research related to corporate cash 
holdings. The first strand of studies examines how the value of corporate cash holdings is 
affected by firm-specific factors (Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2006; Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith, 2006; Faulkender and Wang, 2006). The second strand of studies explains 
why firms hold so much cash (Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2003; Bates, Kahle, 
Stulz, 2006; Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite, 2007; Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 
2008). The value of cash and the level of corporate cash holdings are largely treated as 
separate issues in existing literature. Our study makes two contributions. First, by 
evaluating the impact of earnings quality in an asymmetric information framework, we 
are able to explain that the value of cash holdings could decline and yet firms have 
incentives to hold more cash simultaneously. Second, our study adds to the literature on 
the determinants of the level of corporate cash holdings. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and 
Williamson (1999) and Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998) have identified a set of 
variables that can lead to an estimation of the optimal level of cash holdings. Our results 
show that earnings quality is a significant factor among the determinants of cash holdings 
identified in extant studies. Our accruals quality augmented prediction model has lower 
prediction errors than existing models. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains why poor 
earnings quality constitutes is a risk concern. Section 3 discusses the effects of earnings 
quality on the value and level of corporate cash holdings. Sections 4 and 5 describe the 
methodologies and sample characteristics. Section 6 reports the results. Section 7 
concludes. 
3.2 Poor earnings quality as a firm-specific risk 
The separation of ownership and control in publicly traded firms has led to the 
rise of agency conflicts between firm managers and outside shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Despite accounting earnings are used to 
alleviate the agency conflicts between firm managers and shareholders, managers have 
been found to protect and promote private benefits by manipulating reported accounting 
information (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994; Warfield, Wild, and Wild, 1995; 
Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Coles, Hertzel, and Kalpathy, 2006). Thus, the 
demand for high-quality earnings information is strong from shareholders and 
stakeholders. Investors demand high-quality earnings information in order to better 
monitor mangers and promote contracting efficiencies (Ball, Robin, and Wu, 2003). Poor 
earnings quality, as a result, implies inadequate information for shareholders and 
stakeholders to monitor and discipline managers to act in the investors' interest. 
According to Ball and Shivakumar (2005), lower earnings quality does not imply sub-
optimality because it can arise when the demand for quality is low. For example, investor 
protection is low in East Asian countries; firms in these countries have lower incentives 
to supply high-quality earning information (Fan and Wong, 2002). However, given that 
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the demand for high-quality accounting information from publicly traded firms is 
relatively high in the United States, it is prudent to view that poor earnings quality is 
undesirable and that it constitutes a risk concern. 
Merton (1987) posits that firm-specific risk factors become relevant when 
investors do not have complete information for achieving a fully diversified portfolio. 
Easley and O'Hara (2004) suggest that the risk faced by uninformed investors increases 
when private information is more relative to public information. According to Easley and 
O'Hara, the risk faced by uninformed investors is affected by both the amount of private 
information and by the precision of private information. Poor earnings quality implies an 
increase of private information as well as the supply of imprecise information. Therefore, 
poor earnings quality constitutes a relevant firm-specific risk concern in the spirit of 
Merton and Easley and O'Hara. 
Luez and Verrecchia (2004) take a more direct approach in linking information 
risk and the quality of earnings reports. According to Leuz and Verrecchia, earnings 
reports serve the function of monitoring and aligning the interests of different groups of 
claimholders of the firm. When performance reports are of poor quality, an information 
risk is created. The interests of the claimholders are misaligned because the information 
risk makes coordination difficult, and firm investment decisions could be jeopardized. 
Shareholders, expecting the undesirable effects of poor-quality earnings reports, thus 
demand a risk premium to compensate for the information risk. According to Leuz and 
Verrecchia, the information risk associated with poor earnings quality is a significant 
firm-specific risk. Li (2005) also examines directly the effect of information quality on 
stock performance. He finds that less precise information can increase the risk premium 
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and stock return volatility. He argues that firms should disclose more precise information 
to investors in order to reduce the cost of equity capital. Similarly, Esptein and Schnedier 
(2005) find that investors, particularly those who are ambiguity averse, dislike assets that 
have poor information quality. In the presence of poor-quality information, investors 
demand a premium to compensate for the ambiguity involved. 
In sum, the literature has ample theoretical and empirical supports that poor 
earnings quality is an important firm-specific risk. Poor earnings quality displeases 
investors as it presents incomplete information for making investment decisions. 
3.3 How does poor earnings quality affect corporate cash holdings? 
3.3.1 Effects on the value of cash 
Poor earnings quality implies the inadequate supply of relevant and reliable 
information for investors to monitor and discipline the behavior of firm managers (Ball, 
Robin, and Wu, 2000 and 2003; Ball, 2005). The discretionary use of a firm's cash flow 
by undisciplined firm manager has been well discussed in the literature (Jensen, 1986; 
Stulz, 1990). Difficulties in monitoring firm managers create the potential for 
management to spend internally generated funds on investment projects that are 
beneficial only from a management perspective. For example, Harford (1999) and Bates 
(2005) find evidence that cash-rich firms spend more on acquisitions that perform poorly 
subsequently. Blanchard, Lopez-di-Silanes, and Vishny (1994) report that eleven firms 
with windfall legal settlements appear to engage in wasteful investment and acquisition 
activities. Amihud and Lev (1981) suggest that corporate diversification is likely intended 
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for promoting the private benefits of firm managers. In short, firm managers spend to 
pursue their own objectives at shareholder expense. According to Opler, Pinkowtiz, 
Stulz, and Williamson (1999, henceforth OPSW), cash is like free cash flow. Cash allows 
firm managers to engage in projects that the capital markets would not be willing to 
finance. Thus, entrenched managers have incentives to hold excess cash because it gives 
them more flexibility in pursuing their own objectives while avoiding the effect of market 
discipline. Poor earnings quality weakens investors' ability to mitigate the agency cost of 
managerial discretion. Thus, poor earnings quality has the impact of lowering the value 
of corporate cash holdings when investors expect private benefits to be extracted by 
entrenched managers. 
There is a second route through which poor earnings quality lowers the value of 
corporate cash. Earnings equal cash flow plus accruals. Earnings and cash flow can be 
different because accounting conventions regarding the timing and magnitude of 
revenues and expenses are not necessarily based on cash inflows and outflows. Some 
revenues can be counted towards earnings in the current period even though they have 
not yet been collected in cash. Likewise, non-cash expense items are routinely deducted 
from revenues even though they do not impose cash outlays. As such, the accrual 
component of earnings is subject to a higher degree of uncertainty than is the cash flow 
component; because managers can discretionary manipulate accruals to inflate earnings. 
There is extensive evidence supporting the existence of managerial earnings (accruals) 
management (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998a and 1998b; Teoh and Wong 2002; 
DuCharme, Malatesta, and Sefick, 2004; Louis, 2004; Jo, Kim, and Park, 2007). Some 
researchers find specific evidence that managers manage earnings for private benefits 
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(Perry and Williams, 1994; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Coles et al., 2006). In 
addition, firm managers have incentives to manage earnings because firms meeting 
earnings targets are less likely subject to the scrutiny of outside blockholders (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986; Denis and Serrano, 1996). Poor earnings quality therefore suggests 
the likelihood of earnings management by firm managers for enhancing private benefits, 
among other implications. As a consequence, in the presence of poor earnings quality, 
increasing a firm's holdings of cash by one dollar may increase firm value by less than 
one dollar. 
Hypothesis 1: Poor earnings quality has a negative impact on the value of corporate cash 
holdings. 
3.3.2 Effects on the level of cash holdings 
Earnings supply information of cash flows because cash flow equals earnings less 
accruals. Dechow (1994) shows that current earnings predict future cash flow very well. 
Poor earnings quality therefore implies riskier and less predictable future cash flow. 
OPSW find evidence that firms are likely to hold more cash if their cash flow volatility is 
higher than average. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2006) find that the average cash to assets 
ratio for U.S. industrial firms has increased by 129% from 1980 to 2004. They attribute 
the increase to the riskier cash flows facing U.S. corporations. The results presented by 
Mikkelson and Partch (2004) also imply that firms persistently hold large cash reserves to 
hedge against future cash flow uncertainty. Poor earnings quality, implying riskier future 
cash flow, thus increases the need for firms to hold more cash for precautionary motives. 
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On the other hand, poor earnings quality implies a lower supply of information to 
outsiders and aggravates the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. 
Nanda and Narayanan (1997) argue that the information asymmetry between firm 
managers and the market can lead to misvaluation of the firm's securities. They develop a 
model in which the market can observe the aggregate cash flows of the firm but not the 
individual divisional cash flows, which leads to misvaluation of the firm's securities. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that raising external capital is more costly than using 
internal funds in the presence of asymmetry information and that it may be optimal for 
firms to hold cash to meet the need for investment expenditures. Consistent with Myers 
and Majluf, OPSW argue that information asymmetries make it harder for firms to raise 
outside funds because outsiders want to be certain that the securities they buy are not 
overvalued. Given that poor earnings quality presents outsiders with lesser information, 
outsiders may require a discount to compensate for the uncertainty involved. Thus, poor 
earnings quality has the potential effect of making outside funds more expensive. Firms 
may need to hold more cash when poor earnings quality results in more expensive 
external funds. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms with poor earnings quality tend to hold more cash. 
3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Measuring earnings quality 
There is no consensus among researchers regarding the measuring of earnings 
quality. A common approach measures earnings quality by examining properties of 
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observed accounting numbers. The measures based on this approach are typically related 
to the level of accruals (Sloan, 1996); the estimation error in accruals (Dechow and 
Dichev, 2002); and earnings variability (Francis et al., 2004 and 2005). Another general 
approach for measuring earnings quality focuses on the association between earnings and 
stock returns (Francis and Schipper, 1999; Ecker et al., 2006). The approach extracts 
information about earnings from stock prices by assuming the market is efficient. In this 
study, we follow the first approach in using accounting measures to describe the earnings 
quality of a firm because these measures have been used extensively in the literature and 
have been shown to have significant market effects (Francis et al., 2004 and 2005). The 
chosen accounting measures include accruals quality, absolute abnormal accruals, and 
earnings variability. Francis et al. (2004) report that accruals quality has larger effects on 
cost of capital than other measures such as earnings persistence, predictability, 
smoothness, timeliness, and conservatism; and that earnings variability has about the 
same effect as accruals quality. Francis et al. (2005) also show that the absolute abnormal 
accruals from a Jones (1991) model have about the same capital market effect as accruals 
quality. 
A. Accruals Quality (AQ) 
Our first measure of earnings quality is accruals quality. Accruals quality, AQ, is 
the standard deviation of residuals from regressions relating accruals to cash flows over a 
multi-year period before the merger. A high (low) standard deviation implies a low (high) 
accruals quality. Our method, following Francis et al. (2005), is based on the cross-
sectional Dechow-Dichev (2002) model (all variables are scaled by lagged assets): 
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TCAU = ^ + </>,,j CFOj^ + AJCFOJ, + </>XjCFOjl+, + v„ (Eq. 1) 
Where TCAj>t= (ACAjj,-ACLJ>rACashJ,,+ASTDEBTJ)t )= total current accruals in year t, 
CFOjt = NIBEjt,- TAjt = firm j ' s cash flow from operations in year t, NIBEjt= firm j ' s 
net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18) in year t, TAjt= (ACAj rACLj t-
ACashj>t+ASTDEBTj>t -DEPNj,t) = firm j ' s total accruals in year t, ACAj,t = firm j ' s 
change in current assets (Compustat #4) between year t-1 and year t, ACLjt = firm j ' s 
change in current liabilities (Compustat #5) between year t-1 and year t, firm j ' s change 
ACashjt in cash (Compustat #1) between year t-1 and year t, ASTDEBTjt = firm j ' s 
change in debt in current liabilities (Compustat #34) between year t-1 and year t, DEPNjt 
= firm j ' s depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat #14) in year t, ARevj?t = 
firm j ' s change in revenues (Compustat #12) between year t-1 and year t. 
We first estimate Equation (1) for each industry in year t. Annual cross-sectional 
estimations of (1) are then performed to yield firm- and year-specific residuals, which 
form our accruals quality metric: AQjjt = cr(Vj)t is the standard deviation of firm j ' s 
residuals (vj)t calculated over years t - 4 through t. Larger standard deviations of residuals 
indicate poorer accruals quality. Unlike abnormal accruals generated by the modified 
Jones (1991) model, the AQ proxy employed by Francis et al. has an advantage of taking 
uncertainty into consideration so that a firm that has consistently large residuals may still 
has a good accruals quality because there is no uncertainty about its accruals. We 
calculate values of AQjt = o(vj)t for all firms with available data on Compustat for the 
period from 1980 to 2004. Because a(vj)t is based on five annual residuals, our sample 
has to restrict to firms with at least 7 years of data. For our sample, the mean and median 
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values of AQ are 0.064 and 0.042, respectively. These values are consistent with the ones 
reported by Francis et al. (2005). 
B. Absolute Abnormal Accruals (ABS_ABN_ACC) 
The second measure of earnings quality is the absolute value of abnormal accruals 
(ABS_ABN_ACC) based on the modified Jones (1991) model. First, we estimate the 
following cross-sectional regression for each of the Fama-French (1997) 48 industry 
groups with at least 20 firms in year t: 
TA]t I Assety_,_, = /?, * 1 / Asset,.,_, + /?2 * A Re v,., / Assetj,^ + /?3 * PPEJt I Assety.,_, + ejt (Eq. 2) 
The industry- and year-specific parameter estimates obtained are then used to estimate 
firm-specific normal accruals (NA) as a percentage of lagged total assets: 
A A A 
NAj, =P*\IAssetu_, +/32*ARevjl/AssetJ,_l +/?3 *PPEjtlAsset,,_, +Sj, (Eq. 3) 
Absolute abnormal accruals in year t is equal to the absolute value of the difference 
between the firm-specific actual accruals and the estimated normal accruals. 
C. Earnings Variability (EARNVAR) 
The third measure of earnings quality, earnings variability (EARNVAR), is the 
standard deviation of the firm's earnings over the seven years before the acquisition. 
Earnings is defined as earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Similar 
to the interpretation of the standard deviation of accruals quality, higher earnings 
variability is equivalent to lower earnings quality. 
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3.4.2 Measuring the effect of earnings quality on the value of cash 
To estimate the effect of earnings quality on the value of corporate cash holdings, 
we need a model that relates firm value to firm characteristics. We use the Fama and 
French (1998) regression model for our investigation, similar to other "value of cash" 
papers (Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2004; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2006; 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007). This valuation approach has been shown to give robust 
results under different conditions. In the model of Fama-French, the dependent variable is 
the firm's market-to-book ratio. The independent variables include factors that are likely 
to affect investors' expectations' of future net cash flows, which determine the value of 
the firm. The determinants of future cash flows that Fama and French use as controls are 
past changes, future changes, and current levels of Earnings, R&D Expenses, Dividends, 
Interest Expenses, as well as past and future changes in Assets and Market Value, all 
normalized by the Book Value of Assets of the firm. Included in our model are year 
dummies for capturing macroeconomic and time trend effects, as well as firm dummies 
(fixed effects) for unobserved heterogeneity and industry effects. Specifically, the 
following regression model is used: 
MT//NA = a + & EARN_QUAL + p2 Xcash + /?3 (Xcash*EARN_QUAL) + fi4 
Govindex + /3s(Xcash*EARN_QUAL*Govindex) + j36 (^/^d-i) + 
g Earnings/ + n D2Earnings/ + n DLlEarnings/ + 
^7 /assets ^8 /assets ^9 /assets 
R R&D/ + n D2R&D/ + n DL2R&D/ + n Interests/ + 
yw /sales Hn /assets Hn /assets Hn /assets 
a Dllnterests/ + g DLUnterests/ + n Dlassets/ + 
Hu /assets Fxs /assets Hx6 /assets 
45 
0 DLlassets/ +g Dividends/ + n DIDividends/ + 
Hxi /assets Hn /assets Hx9 /assets 
Ao DL1DividendS/assets +^ 2 1 D2MV/assets + Year Dummy + Firm fixed effects + s 
(Eq. 4a) 
The dependent variable is the firm's market-to-book ratio. The independent variables 
include: Xcash (calculated as the ratio of the difference between the actual cash holdings 
and the optimal cash holdings to assets), Govindex (the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
governance index), the two-year lagged change (DL2), and the 2-year future change 
(D2), and the current realizations of the ratios of the following variables over assets: 
Earnings, Assets, R&D, Interest Expenses, Dividends, and Market Value (only future 
change). In all variables, assets are computed net of cash. 
Firm value and earnings quality may be endogenously determined. Similarly, firm 
value and governance may also exhibit endogenous feedback in their relationship. Thus, 
the above OLS regressions may not fully account for the endogeneity problem in the 
data. Two-stage least squares regressions are commonly used for controlling endogeneity 
problems. However, using 2SLS requires the ability to identify exogenous variables in 
the first stage that are not related to the second-stage dependent variable. Existing studies 
on relationships among firm value, earnings, and governance have frequently used 
similar exogenous variables in the first-stage and second-stage regressions, making it 
difficult for us to identify reasonable instrumental variables. Thus, we follow the 
alternative approach used by Harford et al. (2008) by adding lagged measures of earnings 
quality and governance to our model in order to control for endogeneity problems. The 
following is the alternative model: 
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MV/NA = a + ft EARN_QUAL(l-i) + ft2 Xcash + fti(Xcash*EARN_QUAL) (t.1} + ft, 
Govindexfi.]) + fts(Xcash*EARN_QUAL*Govindex)(,.,)+ ft6 i^/^d-i) 
+ n Earnings/ + n D2Earnings/ + „ DLlEamings/ , 
^7 /assets ^8 /assets ^9 /assets 
0 R&D/ + s D2R&D/ + 0 DL2R&D/ + /? Interests/ + 
Hi0 /sales Hu /assets Hn /assets Hn /assets 
0 D2Interests/ + 0 DLUnterests/ + 0 Dlassets/ + 
HxA /assets r]S /assets Hx6 /assets 
0 DLlassets/ +0 Dividends/ + 0 D2Dividends/ + 
H)1 /assets Hn /assets Hi9 /assets 
Ao DL2DividendS/assets +^ 2 1 D2MV/assets + Year Dummy + Firm fixed effects + s 
(Eq. 4b) 
3.4.3 Measuring the effect of earnings quality on the level of cash holdings 
Our model follows closely those of OPSW (1999) and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 
(2006, henceforth BKS) in measuring the effect of earnings quality on the level of 
corporate cash holdings. The OPSW and BKS models basically are models designed to 
evaluate the determinants of corporate cash holdings. We add earnings quality to the 
estimation model to evaluate its effect on the level of corporate cash holdings. 
Specifically, our model has the following specification: 
CaSVassets = a + & EARN_QUAL + ft2 Industry Sigma + ft3 MTB + ft4 Real Size 
+ A CaShflm/se,s * A
 NWCLsels • P, Cap*** Lemge 
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+ P9 R&D/ 4. p^ Dividummy + J3U Acquisition^ s (Eq. 5) 
where the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book value of assets is the 
dependent variable. AQ is the accruals quality measure discussed above. Industry sigma 
is the mean of standard deviations of cash flow/assets over the previous 10 years for 
firms in the same industry as defined by two-digit SIC code. Market to book is measured 
as (book value of total assets - book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value 
of total assets. Real size is the natural log of the book value of total assets in 2005 dollars. 
Cash flow is defined as (EBITDA - interest - taxes - common dividends). NWC is 
defined as net working capital minus cash and marketable securities. Capex is the ratio of 
capital expenditures to the book value of total assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of 
total debt to the book value of total assets. R&D is the spending and capital expenditures 
on research and development. Dividummy is a dummy variable set to one if the firm paid 
a common dividend in that year, and 0 if it did not. Acquisition activity is measured as 
the ratio of expenditures on acquisitions (Compustat data item #129) relative to the book 
value of total assets. 
3.5 Sample and descriptive statistics of selected variables 
Our sample consists of all US publicly traded firms from 1980 to 2005 for which 
the required data items are available. The requirement that each firm-year observation 
must have at least 7 years of data for estimating the accruals quality (AQ) makes our 
sample bias towards surviving firms that are likely larger and more successful than 
average. This reduces the variation in AQ and makes it more difficult to detect effects, 
thus making our results stronger. The sample includes all Compustat firm-year 
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observations with positive data for the book value of total assets and sales revenue and 
non-missing data for the accruals quality (AQ) variable. Financial firms (SIC code 6000-
6999), utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) and ADRs are excluded, yielding a panel of 
83,287 observations for 9,417 unique firms. Missing explanatory values reduce the final 
sample to 8,621 unique firms with 71,544 firm-year observations. 
We measure cash ratio as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book 
value of total assets. Industry sigma is the mean of standard deviations of cash 
flow/assets over the previous 10 years for firms in the same industry as defined by two-
digit SIC code. Market to book is measured as (book value of total assets - book value of 
equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets. Real size is the natural log of 
the book value of total assets in 2005 dollars. Cash flow is defined as (EBITDA - interest 
- taxes - common dividends). NWC is defined as net working capital minus cash and 
marketable securities. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to the book value of 
total assets. Other variables are included to control for R&D spending, dividend, 
acquisitions, and capital expenditures. Dividend is the common dividend payments over a 
particular year. Acquisition activity is measured as the ratio of expenditures on 
acquisitions (Compustat data item #129) relative to the book value of total assets. 
Table 10 provides summary statistics of the sample firms. The earnings quality 
measure in this table is AQ (accruals quality). Characteristics of firms in the lowest and 
highest earnings quality quartiles are remarkably different. The mean (median) cash ratio 
of firms in the lowest earnings quality quartile (0.191) is more than twice that of firms in 
the highest earnings quality quartile (0.088), and the difference is significant at the 1% 
level. The mean values of AQ for firms in the lowest and highest earnings quality 
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quartiles are 0.133 and 0.005, respectively, and the difference is significant at 1%. 
Besides being smaller, firms in the lowest earnings quality quartile also exhibit 
characteristics that suggest these firms are more risky. The average MTB for firms in the 
lowest earnings quality quartile is significantly higher, which implies a higher systematic 
risk (Fama and French, 1992). In addition to their negative average cash flow and NWC, 
low earnings quality firms also have higher cash flow volatilities (industry sigma), more 
intangible assets (R&D), and more debt. Descriptive statistics based on other measures 
of earnings quality are similar and consistent, and therefore not reported for brevity 
reasons. 
[Table 10 about here] 
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 The effect of earnings quality on the value of corporate cash holdings 
In Panel A of Table 11, we report estimation results of Equation (4a) regarding 
the effect of earnings quality on the value of corporate cash holdings. We follow Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith in using excess cash (Xcash) instead of total cash because total cash 
may not reveal the effect of earnings quality clearly if firm managers do not have 
sufficient discretion in using the cash. Excess cash is the difference between actual cash 
holdings and the optimal (or necessary) cash holdings implied by the OPSW model. 
Note that the sample period in this table is between 1990 and 2003 because of the need to 
predict the optimal cash holdings and control for the effect of corporate governance on 
the value of corporate cash holdings (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Pinkowitz, Stulz, 
and Williamson, 2006). Data for corporate governance (the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
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(2003) corporate governance index) is only available after 1990. Thus, the sample size in 
Table 11 is reduced to 4,310 observations.2 The three measures of earnings quality 
reported in columns 1, 2, and 3 are AQ (accruals quality), ABSABNACC (absolute 
abnormal accruals), and EARNVAR (earnings variability), respectively. In columns 1 
and 3, we find that poor earnings quality significantly reduces firm value. The coefficient 
on AQ in column 1 is significantly negative at 1% and the coefficient on EARNVAR in 
column 3 is significantly negative at 5%. The coefficient on ABS_ABN_ACC in column 
2 is insignificant. In the three regressions, Xcash is positively related to firm value. 
However, all the interaction variables between excess cash and earnings quality have 
negative coefficients. The interaction variables in column 1 (Xcash*AQ) and column 3 
(Xcash*EARNVAR) are negative and significant at the 1% level. That is, for a firm with 
one dollar of excess cash, the value of the dollar is statistically and economically 
significantly lower if the firm has poorer earnings quality. The result implies that 
investors assign a lower market value to the excess cash held by firms with poor earnings 
quality. The finding is consistent with implications that investors are concerned about the 
misuse of excess cash by firms that are more difficult to monitor. The result is consistent 
with the prediction of our first hypothesis. The interaction variable among excess cash, 
earnings quality, and corporate governance has a positive and significant coefficient in 
the three columns. That is, firms with good corporate governance appear able to alleviate 
investors' concerns about the misuse of excess cash. Similar to the result of Dittmar and 
2 The firm-year observations reduce from 71,544 (26 years) to 39,881 (16 years, we need 1980-89 to 
estimate the optimal cash level), and the sample size is consistent with BKS model. The missing value 
for governance index reduces our sample to 4,310 firm-year observations (990 firms). The value 
regression is run from 1990-2003 because 2-year future values are needed for the value equation. Our 
sample size (4,310) is very close to Dittmar's paper in which they reported 4,044 observations from 
1990 to 2003 in a value regression. 
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Mahr-Smith (2006), we also find a negative coefficient on governance (Govindex). 
Dittmar and Mahr-Smith suggest that this might have been caused by endogeneity 
problems. 
In Panel B of Table 11, we use lagged values of earnings quality measures and 
governance index in the regressions in order to account for potential endogeneity 
problems in the data. The results in Panel B are very similar and consistent with those in 
Panel A of Table 11. That is, poor earnings quality reduces firm value; excess cash alone 
has a positive impact on firm value but the interaction between excess cash and earnings 
quality lowers firm value. 
[Table 11 about here] 
3.6.2 The effect of earnings quality on the level of cash holdings 
In Table 12, we divide the sample firms into four quartiles by earnings quality and 
report the mean (median) value of cash holdings held by firms in each quartile. Firms 
with the lowest AQ quality (quartile 4) have a mean cash holdings that is more than two 
times higher than that of firms with the highest AQ quality (quartile 1). The difference is 
0.103 and is significant at 1%. Similar statistics are observed for the other two measures 
of earnings quality. Firms with the lowest EARNVAR quality (quartile 4) hold a mean 
(median) cash level that is 3 (4) times more than firms with the highest EARNVAR 
quality (quartile 1). The results in Table 12 show that firms with higher earnings quality 
hold significantly less cash than firms with lower earnings quality. This is consistent with 
the prediction of hypothesis 2. 
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[Table 12 about here] 
Table 13 presents results of regression equation 5. The sample period is between 
1980 and 2005, and the sample includes 71,544 firm-year observations with 8,631 unique 
firms. In Panel A, the earnings quality measure is AQ. The first column of Panel A 
reports results using the Fama-Macbeth (1973) method. This method eliminates serial 
correlation in the residuals of a time-series cross-sectional regression. Newey-West 
adjusted t-values are reported. Similar to OPSW, we find corporate cash holdings 
decrease significantly with firm size, net working capital, capital expenditure, leverage, 
whether a firm pays dividends, and the ratio of expenditures on acquisitions to assets. On 
the other hand, corporate cash holdings increase significantly with poor earnings quality 
(AQ), industry cash flow volatility, the market-to-book ratio, the cash flow-to-assets 
ratio, and the R&D-to-sales ratio. The positive coefficient on earnings quality supports 
our hypothesis 2 that firms with poorer earnings quality tend to hold more cash. In Table 
13, we also present a time-series cross-sectional regression estimation with year 
dummies, and a time-series cross-sectional regression estimation with year and industry 
dummies. The results of these two regressions are consistent and similar to those using 
the Fama-Macbeth method. The coefficient on AQ is positive in columns 2 and 3 and 
significant at the 1% level with a much larger t-statistic than in column 1. The last 
column in Panel A of Table 13 shows the result of a cross-sectional regression approach 
of equation 5. This approach, using the average of the variables over the sample period 
for the firms, reduces the number of observations to 8631. The results are consistent with 
53 
those of the other three regressions. That is, poor earnings quality increases corporate 
cash holdings. 
In Panel B of Table 13 the measure of earnings quality is EARNVAR. The 
coefficient on EARNVAR is insignificant in column 1, but is highly significant in the 
other three columns. Overall, the results are similar to Panel A. That is, firms with lower 
earnings quality hold more excess cash. 
[Table 13 about here] 
There may be some inconsistencies in the regression results in Table 13 because 
some variables, such as leverage, cash holdings, capital expenditures, and dividends are 
simultaneously determined. Therefore, we use a reduced-from regression approach to re-
estimate equation 5 in which we exclude the capital expenditures, leverage, and dividend 
variables. The results of these reduced-form regressions are reported in Table 14. The 
results are similar and consistent with those reported in Table 13. 
[Table 14 about here] 
3.6.3 Robustness Test 
In Table 15, we present results showing the contribution of earnings quality as a 
determinant of the level of corporate cash holdings. First of all, we predict the optimal 
cash level of each year from 1990 to 2005 using the Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2006) model 
(which is basically a modified OPSW model), and then compare the predicted amount of 
each year with the actual cash holdings. The difference is the prediction error. The cash 
ratio is computed as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book value of total 
assets. Estimates from the BKS model regression are as follows: Cash ratio = 0.2192 + 
0.0532 Industry cash flow volatility + 0.0119 Market-to-book - 0.0108 Real size + 0.0705 
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Cash-flow/Assets - 0.1495 Net working capital/Assets - 0.3247 Capital 
expenditures/Assets - 0.2066 Leverage + 0.1597 R&D/Sales +0.4000 Dividends/Assets -
0.1579 Acquisitions/Assets + 0.0523 Net equity/Assets + 0.1168 Net debt/Assets. 
Next, we add the earnings quality measure (AQ) to the model and repeat the 
process. Estimates from AQ model regression are as follows: Cash ratio = 0.2148 + 
0.1233 AQ + 0.0430 Industry cash flow volatility + 0.0114 Market-to-book - 0.0104 Real 
size + 0.0745 Cash-flow/Assets - 0.1493 Net working capital/Assets - 0.3275 Capital 
expenditures/Assets - 0.2068 Leverage + 0.1561 R&D/Sales +0.4147 Dividends/Assets -
0.1582 Acquisitions/Assets + 0.0508 Net equity/Assets + 0.1166 Net debt/Assets. Then 
we compare the prediction errors of the BKS model and our AQ-augmented model. In 
Table 15, the results show that the AQ-augmented model has smaller prediction errors in 
13 of the 16 years between 1990 and 2005. In seven years, the difference is statistically 
significant, particularly in the period after 2000. The results validate that earnings quality 
has a significant impact on corporate cash holdings. However, results in Panel B of 
15show that EARNVAR is not as successful as AQ in helping to predict the optimal cash 
ratio. 
[Table 15 about here] 
3.7 Conclusions 
It has been found in recent research that the market value of corporate cash holdings 
could be less than the actual dollar value when investors expect private benefits to be 
extracted by firm managers from the cash holdings. Poor corporate governance has been 
identified as a major reason accounting for the phenomenon, both domestically and 
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internationally. At the same time, researchers find that US firms are holding more and 
more cash reserves, and the amounts well exceed those predicted by conventional 
models. While the two phenomena are not necessarily inconsistent, researchers in general 
treat the two as separate issues. In considering earnings quality as an information risk, we 
are able to explain that poor earnings quality has a negative impact on the value of 
corporate cash holdings and a positive impact on the level of cash reserves. That is, the 
two phenomena could exist simultaneously and that they are not necessarily inconsistent 
with each other. We offer explanations that are related to the predictions of agency 
theories and asymmetric information arguments. In relating earnings quality to corporate 
cash holdings, we highlight investors' concerns about the discretionary use of corporate 
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Table 1 Industry and event-year distribution of 786 eligible mergers and 
acquisitions that took place between 1993 and 2004. 










































Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 
Metal Mining 
Oil and Gas; Petroleum Refining 
Mining & Quarrying of Nonmetallic Minerals (No Fuels) 
Heavy Construction 
Construction - Special Trade Contractors 
Food and Kindred Products 
Textile Mill Products 
Apparels 
Lumber, and Wood Products 
Furniture, and Fixtures 
Paper and Allied Products 
Printing, Publishing, and Allied Services 
Chemicals and Allied Products 
Oil and Gas; Petroleum Refining 
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 
Primary Metals 
Fabricated Metal Products 
Machinery 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 
Transportation Equipment 
Measuring, Medical, Photo Equipment; Clocks 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 
Transportation and Shipping (except air) 
Motor Freight Transportation 
Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 
Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods 
Miscellaneous Retail Trade 
Retail Trade-General Merchandise 
Retail Trade-Food Stores 
Retail Trade- Apparel and Accessory 
Retail Trade-Eating and Drinking Places 
Miscellaneous Retail Trade 
Hotels and Casinos 
Personal Services 
Advertising Services 
Motion Picture Production and Distribution 










































80 Health Services 





Panel B. Sample distribution by year 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 









Notes: The sample includes Mergers and Acquisitions with pure cash, stock, or mixed 
payment methods during 1993-2004 as reported by Securities Data Corporation. 
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Table 2 Sample Descriptive Statistics for 786 eligible mergers and acquisitions that 
took place between 1993 and 2004. 
Panel A (Full sample) 
AQ and AQ1 are measured by the standard deviation of firm j ' s residuals from cross-sectional 
regressions over year t-4 to year t based on the modified and unmodified Dechow-Dichev (2002) 
models respectively. EARNVAR is the standard deviation of the firm's earnings over 7 years 
before the M&A event. AQ2 is the absolute value of abnormal accruals generated by the modified 
Jones (1991) approach. Innate AQ is an estimate of the innate portion of firm j ' s accrual quality 
from Dechow-Dichev (DD) model while DiscAQ is the estimate of the discretionary component 
of firm j ' s accrual quality. FINLEVER is the total interest bearing debt to total assets, prior to 
deal announcement. RUN_UP is the cumulative stock buy and hold return of the bidder over the 
year preceding the announcement month. MTB is the ratio of the market value of equity over the 
book value of equity prior to deal announcement. INSIDEROWN is the shares owned by 
corporate insiders divided by total shares outstanding. BLOCK is a (01) dummy variable that has 
a value of 1 if outside blockholders owning more than 5% of the stock, and is 0 otherwise. CASH 
and STOCK are the percentage of cash and stock financed in deals respectively. INDR equals 1 if 
the bidder's and the target's primary 4-digit SIC code coincides, and equals 0 otherwise. 
UNLISTEDTGT equals 1 if the target is an unlisted stand-alone company, and equals 0 
otherwise. SUBSID equals 1 if the target is an unlisted subsidiary of another firm and equals 0 
otherwise. a(CFO) is the standard deviation of cash flow from operations. o(Sales) is the 
standard deviation of sales. OperCycle is the firm j ' s Operation Cycle). Negative Earnings is the 
incidence of negative earnings over the sample period. 
Variables 
Accruals Quality (AQ) 
Earning Variability (EARNVAR) 
Accruals Quality 1 (AQ1) 




Financial Leverage (FINLEVER) 
Deal Value ($mils) 
Run-up (RUNJJP) 
Market-To-Book ratio (MTB) 
Insider ownership (INSIDEROWN) 
Block Ownership (BLOCK) 
Intra-industry Target (INDR) 
Unlisted Target (UNLISTEDTGT) 
Subsidary (SUBSID) 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10 Descriptive Statistics (1980-2005) 
The sample includes all Compustat firm-year observations from 1980 to 2005 with positive data 
for the book value of total assets and sales revenue and non-missing data for Earnings Quality 
variables for firms incorporated in the United States. Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999), 
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) and ADRs are excluded from the sample yielding a panel of 
83,287 observations for 9,417 unique firms. Missing explanatory values reduce the panel to 
71,544 firm-year observations for 8,621 unique firms. Means and medians of measures of firm 
characteristics of 71,544 firm years are presented. AQ is measured by the standard deviation of 
firm j ' s residuals from cross-sectional regressions over year t-4 to year t based on Dechow-
Dichev (2002) model. EARNVAR is the standard deviation of the firm's earnings over 7 years. 
The absolute value of abnormal accruals is generated by the modified Jones (1991) approach. 
Cash ratio is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book value of total assets. Industry 
sigma is the mean of standard deviations of cash flow/assets over 10 years for firms in the same 
industry as defined by two-digit SIC code. Market to book is measured as: (book value of total 
assets - book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets. Real size is the 
natural log of the book value of total assets in 2005 dollars. Cash flow is defined as (EBITDA -
interest - taxes - common dividends). NWC is defined as net working capital minus cash and 
marketable securities. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to the book value of total 
assets. Other variables are included to control for R&D spending, dividend, acquisitions, and 
capital expenditures. Dividend is the common dividend payments over a particular year. 
Acquisition activity is measured as the ratio of expenditures on acquisitions (Compustat data item 












































































































































































*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
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Table 11 Regressions of the impact of Earnings Quality on the value of excess cash 
holdings (1990-2003) 
Panel A 
The value regression sample consists of our sample starting from 1990 to 2003 for which the 
required data items are available. We begin our sample in 1990 because our corporate governance 
measures, the Gompers, ishii, and Metrick (2003) corporate governance index (GIM index), is 
only available since 1990. Also we use a Fama-MacBeth model over the period 1980-1989 to 
predict optimal cash holding for each firm over 1990 to 2003. In all variables, assets are 
computed net of cash. The dependent variable in all models is the ratio of the firm's market value 
to assets. The independent variables include: Xcash is calculated as the ratio of the difference 
between the actual cash holdings and the optimal cash holdings to assets. AQ is measured by the 
standard deviation of firm j ' s residuals from cross-sectional regressions over year t-4 to year t 
based on the Dechow-Dichev (2002) model. EARNVAR is the standard deviation of the firm's 
earnings over 7 years. The absolute value of abnormal accruals is generated by the modified 
Jones (1991) approach. Govindex is measured as GIM scores varying between zero and 24. The 
two-year lagged change (dL2), the 2-year future change (d2), and the current realizations of the 
ratios of the following variables over assets: Earnings, Assets, R&D, Interest Expenses, 
Dividends, and Market Value (only future change). Following Hartford et al. (2007) paper, as an 
endogeneity control, we include the lagged market value to assets in the models. P-values are 
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The value regression sample consists of our sample starting from 1990 to 2003 for which the 
required data items are available. We begin our sample in 1990 because our corporate governance 
measures, the Gompers, ishii, and Metrick (2003) corporate governance index (GIM index), is 
only available since 1990. Also we use a Fama-MacBeth model over the period 1980-1989 to 
predict optimal cash holding for each firm over 1990 to 2003. In all variables, assets are 
computed net of cash. The dependent variable in all models is the ratio of the firm's market value 
to assets. The independent variables include: Xcash is calculated as the ratio of the difference 
between the actual cash holdings and the optimal cash holdings to assets. AQ is measured by the 
standard deviation of firm j ' s residuals from cross-sectional regressions over year t-4 to year t 
based on the Dechow-Dichev (2002) model. EARNVAR is the standard deviation of the firm's 
earnings over 7 years. The absolute value of abnormal accruals generated by the modified Jones 
(1991) approach. Govindex is measured as GIM scores varying between zero and 24. The two-
year lagged change (dL2), the 2-year future change (d2), and the current realizations of the ratios 
of the following variables over assets: Earnings, Assets, R&D, Interest Expenses, Dividends, and 
Market Value (only future change). Following Hartford et al.(2007) paper, as an endogeneity 
control, we include the lagged market value to assets , lagged earnings quality proxies, lagged 
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Table 13: Regressions estimating the determinants of cash holdings (19S0-2005) 
Panel A (AQ as the measure for Earning Quality) 
The sample includes all Compustat firm-year observations from 1980 to 2005 with 
positive data for the book value of total assets and sales revenue and non-missing data for 
Accruals quality (AQ) for firms incorporated in the US. Financial firms (SIC code 6000-
6999), utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) and ADRs are excluded from the sample yielding 
a panel of 83,287 observations for 9,417 unique firms. Missing explanatory values reduce 
the panel to 71,544 firm-year observations for 8,621 unique firms. The dependent 
variable in all regressions is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book value 
of total assets (the cash ratio). AQ is measured by standard deviation of firm j ' s residuals, 
from year t-4 to t from annual cross-sectional estimations of the Dechow-Dichev (2002) 
model. Industry sigma is the mean of standard deviations of cash flow/assets over 10 
years for firms in the same industry as defined by two-digit SIC code. Market to book is 
measured as: (book value of total assets - book value of equity + market value of 
equity)/book value of total assets. Real size is the natural log of the book value of total 
assets in 2005 dollars. Cash flow is defined as (EBITDA - interest - taxes - common 
dividends). NWC is defined as net working capital minus cash and marketable securities. 
Capex is the ratio of capital expenditures to the book value of total assets. Leverage is 
defined as the ratio of total debt to the book value of total assets. R&D is the spending 
and capital expenditures on research and development. Dividummy is a dummy variable 
set to one if the firm paid a common dividend in that year, and 0 if it did not. Acquisition 
activity is measured as the ratio of expenditures on acquisitions (Compustat data item 
#129) relative to the book value of total assets. The Fama-MacBeth model gives the 
average of the time series of coefficients from annual cross-sectional regressions. The 
cross-sectional regression uses the means of all variables for each firm. T statistics are 








































































































































*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
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Table 13 continued. Panel B (Earnvar as the measure for Earning Quality) 
The sample includes all Compustat firm-year observations from 1980 to 2005 with 
positive data for the book value of total assets and sales revenue and non-missing data for 
Earnings variability for firms incorporated in the US. Financial firms (SIC code 6000-
6999), utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) and ADRs are excluded from the sample. Missing 
explanatory values reduce the panel to 166,972 firm-year observations for 15,166 unique 
firms. The dependent variable in all regressions is the ratio of cash and marketable 
securities to the book value of total assets (the cash ratio). EARNVAR is the standard 
deviation of the firm's earnings over 7 years. Industry sigma is the mean of standard 
deviations of cash flow/assets over 10 years for firms in the same industry as defined by 
two-digit SIC code. Market to book is measured as: (book value of total assets - book 
value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets. Real size is the 
natural log of the book value of total assets in 2005 dollars. Cash flow is defined as 
(EBITDA - interest - taxes - common dividends). NWC is defined as net working capital 
minus cash and marketable securities. Capex is the ratio of capital expenditures to the 
book value of total assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to the book value 
of total assets. R&D is the spending and capital expenditures on research and 
development. Dividummy is a dummy variable set to one if the firm paid a common 
dividend in that year, and 0 if it did not. Acquisition activity is measured as the ratio of 
expenditures on acquisitions (Compustat data item #129) relative to the book value of 
total assets. The Fama-MacBeth model gives the average of the time series of coefficients 
from annual cross-sectional regressions. The cross-sectional regression uses the means of 
all variables for each firm. T statistics are reported in the parenthesis. We report Newey-








































































































































*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
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Table 14: Modified regressions estimating the determinants of cash holdings (1980-
2005) 
Panel A (AQ as the measure for Earning Quality) 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to 
the book value of total assets (the cash ratio). Panel A shows reduced form regressions 
that omit capital expenditures, leverage and dividends. Panel B shows regressions that 
include a measure for the difference in cash holdings. AQ is measured by standard 
deviation of firm j ' s residuals, from year t-4 to t from annual cross-sectional estimations 
of the Dechow-Dichev (2002) model. Industry sigma is the mean of standard deviations 
of cash flow/assets over 10 years for firms in the same industry as defined by two-digit 
SIC code. Market to book is measured as: (book value of total assets - book value of 
equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets. Real size is the natural log of 
the book value of total assets in 2005 dollars. Cash flow is defined as (EBITDA - interest 
- taxes - common dividends). NWC is defined as net working capital minus cash and 
marketable securities. Capex is the ratio of capital expenditures to the book value of total 
assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to the book value of total assets. R&D 
is the spending and capital expenditures on research and development. Dividummy is a 
dummy variable set to one if the firm paid a common dividend in that year, and 0 if it did 
not. Acquisition activity is measured as the ratio of expenditures on acquisitions 
(Compustat data item #129) relative to the book value of total assets. Difference in cash 
is the change in cash over net assets from year t to year t + 1. The Fama-MacBeth model 
gives the average of the time series of coefficients from annual cross-sectional 
regressions. The cross-sectional regression uses the means of all variables for each firm. 
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*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
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Table 14 continued. 
Panel B (Earnvar as the measure for Earning Quality) 
The sample includes all Compustat firm-year observations from 1980 to 2005 with 
positive data for the book value of total assets and sales revenue and non-missing data for 
Earnings variability for firms incorporated in the US. Financial firms (SIC code 6000-
6999), utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) and ADRs are excluded from the sample. Missing 
explanatory values reduce the panel to 166,972 firm-year observations for 15,166 unique 
firms. The dependent variable in all regressions is the ratio of cash and marketable 
securities to the book value of total assets (the cash ratio). EARNVAR is the standard 
deviation of the firm's earnings over 7 years. Industry sigma is the mean of standard 
deviations of cash flow/assets over 10 years for firms in the same industry as defined by 
two-digit SIC code. Market to book is measured as: (book value of total assets - book 
value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets. Real size is the 
natural log of the book value of total assets in 2005 dollars. Cash flow is defined as 
(EBITDA - interest - taxes - common dividends). NWC is defined as net working capital 
minus cash and marketable securities. Capex is the ratio of capital expenditures to the 
book value of total assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to the book value 
of total assets. R&D is the spending and capital expenditures on research and 
development. Dividummy is a dummy variable set to one if the firm paid a common 
dividend in that year, and 0 if it did not. Acquisition activity is measured as the ratio of 
expenditures on acquisitions (Compustat data item #129) relative to the book value of 
total assets. Difference in cash is the change in cash over net assets from year t to year t + 
1. The Fama-MacBeth model gives the average of the time series of coefficients from 
annual cross-sectional regressions. The cross-sectional regression uses the means of all 
variables for each firm. T statistics are reported in the parenthesis. We report Newey-west 
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